Free Will, Agency and Existence

Free will is an illusive term which is difficult to define. This piece will attempt to clarify definitions and deal with the fallout of certain conclusions.

A Complicated Idea

We have free will. It’s self-evident… Right?

I had thought to abstain from this topic, but I think its widespread propagation is imminent with the popularisation of neuroscience (often through self help study) and even quantum physics. A certain degree of preparedness appears to be necessary. The subject may even have made its way into our ideas about the world already, as will be explained. Since this is a delicate idea, I shall attempt provide a careful and actionable guide through the topic, starting with a brief context overview of the kinds of implications it might have.

This is a clearly a complicated subject. I do not expect readers to understand it on a first pass - I certainly did not. Thus, I have left some further resources from experts in the relative fields at the bottom of the page.

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The Side Effects

Robert Sapolsky, who in myriad ways I admire, for his eloquent transmission of information and advocacy for the moral applications of science, makes an erroneous step on the implications of not having free will. This being, his suggestion that the loss of belief in free will shall only be thought about once a month or so, before we forget that it isn’t there. This appears to be because he confuses his experience of the principal with the possible reactions of others. I know that for many, free will is the driving force of self worth and moral calibration. How, if one’s character is so greatly comprised of such an assumption, could they forget about it when it formed a crucial link in their world view? He also thinks that the feelings of being proud, or ashamed of one’s achievements are misplaced, the reasoning for which will become apparent. Sapolsky believes a conversion to this manner of thinking would provide a net good, but I am not sure it is so black and white.

Dr Daniel Denett refers to a study which showed that people who had read an excerpt that points to a lack of free will before being given the ability to cheat in a game, would subsequently be more likely to do so than the other group who had read content in favour of believing in free will. Assuming the study was reliable, there arises a deep issue in introducing such an idea to the general populous. I do not believe in the suppression of truth. If it is indeed that free will does not exist, or even that such an idea be of strong competition with other theories, it should be made known. However, it should also be accompanied compelling reasons not to let it lead to a fall to nihilism or irresponsibility. Rather than accepting outright Sapolsky's assessment that things will ultimately head in a positive direction, we should instead indulge the very real risk that this is not going to be the case, or indeed that it has not been entirely the case thus far.

Luckily, not everything is doom and gloom for the ‘no free will’ worldview. It appears that the ‘no free will’ argument is very practical in domains of empathy and accountability, for reasons that will become evident. Examples of these areas are: determining laws of insanity and addressing rehabilitation. It also lends us some very powerful new contextualisations and answerable questions, which might never have been discovered had not for the particular concerns that such an assumption brings about.

Getting Definitions Right

This is a final warning to those who do not want to risk uprooting their most firmly held perceptions. It is not too late to head to another of my posts. You’re free to go… Or are you?

In debates between biologists, and physicists, and philosophers, there seems to be a trend emerging. Definitions keep getting muddled, and amidst the confusion have arisen two concepts of free will which are not as closely related as they appear.

As a start, it would be apt to form a definition of free will’s use in discourse, as best I can approximate it. Mariam Webster’s definitions of compound words are influenced by common parlance and might entrench implicit conclusions about the term, so I will instead use their conceptions of “free” and “will” separately to construct a more fundamental definition of “free will”.

Free (3b): “determined by the choice of the actor or performer”

Will (6a): “something desired”

THUS

Free will: A desire, which is determined by the choice of the actor

I would add that “will” tends to be a more strongly engaged version of the word “desire”, the former more heavily contextualised by its interplay with action. The two shall nonetheless appear relatively interchangeably, so as not to exhaust one or the other.

Non-determinate Will

The first definition of free will and the most debated is that seen above, and requires that we have the ability to form a will indeterministically. Free from biological imperative, destiny, nor any other restraint. Arthur Schopenhauer had this to say:

“A man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills.”

This means that to have free will, one must be allowed to desire whatever they want. However, they cannot desire whatever they want, because they are limited by their preference, which in itself is a desire of seeking higher value; to have one thing more than another. The conceptual incoherence here is the point. For free will to work, one would have to be presented with every desire of an infinite list of possibilities and pick one both indifferently (free from an existing desire), and intentionally (which cannot be done without a value judgment). This idea makes the production of a non-determinate will impossible, but it might not rule out some type of scale of determination: what is the creation of a will determined by? And, does that determinate factor allow room for some degree of free will?

Biological phenomena make our understanding of free will more complicated, but less abstract. One such phenomena is the infamous case of Phineas Gage, who had a severe injury to the prefrontal cortex (which regulates decisions) and subsequently lost many inhibitions. The localisation of one part of the brain as being able to modulate how our wills manifest in reality makes it very difficult to separate the concepts of will and organic matter. This argument against free will is then dwarfed by the deterministic worldview, which, by using principles of quantum physics, posits that the future already exists through the lens of time as another dimension in the spacetime continuum. I won’t pretend to understand every mechanism, but the upshot is that our actions are already recorded and we are bound to play them out, like a film. If we can only follow one path, determined by the universe, how then can we be free to will indeterministically?

The injury of Phineas Gage

In order to reconcile these troubles, one might have to conclude that there is a divine spark in them, which embodies the “I” in “I am”, or their essence, and allows them to be free to will anything, even within these observable frameworks. Even if this were true, it raises the same questions of free will, only dictated more heavily by divinity than biology or physics. I will add here that one might be content to accept this divine contextualisation for their life, allowing that a deity or higher realm is a worthy master. The other option is to default to randomness, accepting that there will be more and less likely desires arising in us, yet that no specific will occurs until the die is rolled. This is the same story as in the previous concepts, but now a person is simply dictated by a die and capitulates to the doctrine of randomness instead.

Internalised Will

The second definition is proposed by compatibilists, who (generalising) believe that the ability to localise decision making to processes inside the body is free will. Then, the only way in which one does not have free will is by physical restraint; one wishes to travel the world, but is confined by a prison, and thus their will cannot be actualised. They might also concede that a believed or actual threat of violence could be seen as a negation of freedom. Really, this group of thinkers are creating a distinct concept, which might be seen as the freedom to pursue the will as action, once it has arisen. Their philosophy is the more practical for orientating ourselves in the world. by my estimation, since it can be described empirically. However, it is certainly the less compatible - ironically - with the most semantically sound definition of “free will”.

What Compatibilists do tell us, is that the will itself is not always the most important element in freedom. We may be unable to break free of the bondage of determined timelines and biological diktat, but we can consciously interact with self limitations, social limitations and systems to craft more fulfilling, impactful experiences for ourselves and others. In short, an experience based model.

How free can we be?

“You could have only chosen differently, if you were different”

- Bernardo Kastrup PHD

If it is true that in any moment, we create the decision that our current experience and biology are destined to, it encourages us to adopt a broader vision of our lives. We will inevitably make grand decisions, but each of those will be avalanches from the build up of smaller decisions. Our sum experience in that moment.

One of the main approaches I have seen recommended as part of living with this belief, or rather dis-belief, in free will, is to appreciate what one experiences, but not to think that they could do any differently. This passivity does not seem healthy to me, but the experiential framework is useful; everyone loves to compare life to a rollercoaster, so let’s run with the analogy.

Analogy parameters: The rider is the being of conscious experience and attention. The carriage is the total self: personality, and knowledge, and subconscious. The tracks are the timeline of life in a deterministic universe.

Would you prefer a rickety carriage, or a sturdy one? Perhaps one with regular safety inspections and maintenance. If there really is no free will, it is still in our best interest to try to make our carriage, at least in appearance, comfortable and secure. This ironically requires some hard work and study; we must be effective engineers of our own character and we can only do so if we are competent in those aspects of life that resonate with us. Maybe, we’ll even become efficient enough to go help (or advise) someone else in repairing their carriage.

Here’s another way to contextualise this idea. How many of us are existentially devastated that we did not hatch from an egg, or that we didn’t simply appear from thin air? I would wager only a minority. This points to the conclusion that we do not on average spend a great deal of time worrying about the fact that we did not create ourselves. However, in the free will debate, one feels differently; that is, they are upset at the very nature of the birth of a will. Once one accepts that they have not created their will (if that is indeed their conclusion) they can choose to engage in the interactive experience that the will allows us to participate in.

Inevitably one shall find invisible barriers arising in the external world: emotional (such as shame), preventative (such as laws), cognitive (such as perceived or actual entrapment by, a disorder) and so on. However they shall also be restricted by ability: physical ability to traverse, ability to generate wealth, and practically anything else that opens up, rather than constricts new experiences. Each of our simulations has a different configuration from birth and grows or shrinks as we expand our control, or have control imposed on us. We could sit back and let those barriers fluctuate on their own, refusing even to explore what is available to us, but we would have wasted the opportunity and potential of experience granted to us.

This venturing out is what might be called exposure. In my previous article, I posited that fiction is a necessary accompaniment of the intellect. If we truly accept that we have no free will, we need a new framework, a new fiction by which to contextualize our actions. The best I can suggest right now, and Sam Harris seems to agree on this point, is to punctuate life with exposure. Exposure to stimulating ideas, activities and challenges. All those things that build character and allow one to make those grand decisions with more knowledge of themselves and the world. It is an experience-based model, which isn’t intrinsically passive.

A Hierarchy of Desires

It is often that we see will in the way that one might traditionally identify attention. A single will becomes one’s focus, and absorbs them entirely, until they desire something else. However, like attention, which can be affective and scattered, many disparate wills seems to exist in a constant hierarchy, from which the brain selects what it considers the most valuable in any moment.

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At the top of this hierarchy, but also least accessible, is what I shall henceforth name the ‘essential will’. This is the will to morality and orients every other will. It has no concrete answers only a vague desire for a better world, for a worse world, or simply to step back with indifference. For all intents and purposes, it doesn’t matter what someone’s hypothetical worlds look like, only that someone desires a value between “better” and “worse”. Other subordinate wills arise, some aligned to that essential will, others disharmonious. Each time that one chooses a will to mobilise as a physical action, or even chooses to not act, their essential will rewards them with harmony (content), or discord (guilt). The complication arises in that there are communication errors when travelling from the essential will to actions, and from the world back to the essential will. A very good person at their core, can act recklessly by miscalculation of the consequences of their actions, or the world’s trials and tribulations can simply turn them bitter.

The essential will seems to be the deepest morality: It is the source, from which cascade myriad solutions and ideals, which are procedurally linked. For example:

“I want a better world (Essential will). Ergo:

1. I want humans to be in harmony with nature

2. Ergo, I want animals to be protected from unnecessary harm

3. Ergo, I want corporations who abuse animals to be punished

4. Ergo, we should also punish supporters of such corporations

5. Ergo, all thinking and philosophies that encourage support for those corporations should be suppressed

6. Ergo, we should disparage and berate anyone who’s ideas might support those ideas

7. Ergo, we should introduce laws to censor speech in order to strengthen this suppression”

Some readers might be in utter agreement with this progression. I think it is fair to say that many would agree with the first two or three progressions from the essential will, and then find the proceeding ones increasingly untenable. The issue is that the moment that one of these conclusions is falsified or even sub-optimal, it introduces a poison which dilutes into all of the subsequent conclusions. I believe that this is the rationale behind much of the polarization of the modern day. Not the pervasiveness of evil essential wills, but confused actions and misinterpretation.

Bojack Horseman is a surprisingly profound interrogation of this actualization of the essential will. “Surprisingly”, given that it takes place in a world of anthropomorphic characters and comic scenarios. [Spoilers ahead] A scene that always stuck with me was in the finale when one of the main characters, Diane, tells Bojack that she doesn't believe in the “deep down” of being good, that actions are the only real gauge of goodness. I disagree with this assessment in a holistic sense, but agree with the practical implications. I believe that the process of actualization means setting principles that logically and optimally follow from the essential will and sticking to them to the best of one’s abilities. However, to do this successfully, we need to be in control and intelligent about our decisions.

Agency is Important

It is counter-intuitive. The less we believe that our actions are within our control, the more we act out to distort the external world. We try to externalise our will so that it becomes a shield from contrary ideas. And in doing so, we experience less and become more defensive; or, we collapse even further inside of ourselves, and become passive observers to our own lives. A society that does not believe in personal responsibility shall inevitably turn to their power structure to enforce their will on others, or disengage. Apathy and authoritarian thinking are two expressions of the same, usually subconscious, lack of control. Antidotes to this are best measured by how much they increase agency: the degree to which one is in conscious control of their actions.

Given the incohesive effect that a feeling of helplessness in a population creates, there are strong arguments for working more intimately with one’s preference, one’s character, one’s presence. Everyone should test the bounds of their control over the will, to assess where the actual or illusory barriers arise. To be compelled to do something, and to do opposite, merely to feel the triumph over one’s most immediate desire. Our wills are fragmented into processes, which make us creatures of habit in daily life, and in hard times, creature of instinct. These are reactionary, and therefore less conscious; a direct reduction of agency. So, how do we turn this around?

Intellect as Agency

“One must have a good memory to be able to keep the promises one has given. One must have strong powers of imagination to be able to have pity. So closely is morality bound to the quality of the intellect”

- Friedrich Nietzsche

Nietzsche posits that morality and intellect are almost inextricably linked. I would go one step further, to say that intellect is the agent that brings the essential will (morality) in line with actions. To run on pure instinct is mechanistic. It is playing out a program and leaving it to go on until it corrupts or the hardware breaks down. It is riding a rollercoaster whilst the carriage rusts and breaks apart. The cortex (intellect) is the only aspect of our conscious brain that can make real time edits to this program as it runs - this is that selection from the hierarchy of wills previously observed. We have several options: we could surrender to determinism or biology, and let our cortex become lazy and nonchalant; we could self-impose more stringent rules on it, such as a strict morality; or, we could let it be dominated by emotions. Either way, the cortex, with its conscious decision making, is the leader who has the last say on the body’s trajectory. In some sense it forms the inner voice we speak to when dealing with things. The questions that all of us must ask of it are: “Do I trust this leader to weigh up the emotional information, the instinctual drives and make the best decision for my body and future?” And for those with a chaotic mind, “How can I make this leader listen to me?”

To return to the compatibilists with their useful distinction between internal will and its correlation with action, there does seem to be some causal chain of desires being modulated by systems in the brain. This chain may arise from a first, uncaused decision (inspired by the metaphysical concept of the unmoved mover) in the body, and yet set in motion the subsequent diffusion of action. Or, it may be the result of a gazillion convergences of fate in a determined universe. Either way, at some point we are given intellectual agency over causation. From either of these determined or undetermined standpoints, we can assert that we have at least illusory agency over internal processes, for we have anecdotal and empirical evidence.

Personality vs Disorder

One of the important insights that the ‘no free will’ conclusion grants us, particularly in the biological, social and legal domains, is that of accountability. As a result of recognising that we may not be wholly responsible for our actions, certain criminals are allowed an insanity plea, which is based on their comprehension of the law and morality: whether they can identify that their actions are breaking the rules, or in cases where they successfully identify the rules, whether they are actually capable of following them. In cases where it is evident that the convicted was compelled to act in a certain way because of injury to cognition or a disorder, they are not punished in the traditional sense, but are instead given psychiatric interventions. It seems that many of these cases are of an instinctual will bypassing the measures of the brain that would typically modulate that will into acceptable behaviour. This is something like the Id winning out in the Freudian war for the ego, for those familiar.

With the rise of self-diagnosis of disorders, there have arisen several concerns. For example, that the diagnosed disorders will be taken less seriously on account of misdiagnosis of less severe cases, or that those who are suffering most will be disrespected. What, in my estimation, is of graver concern is that self-diagnosis can lead to reduced responsibility and agency. For clarification, I see agency as the degree to which one is consciously in charge of their actions.

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I have some stakes in this game. I used to suffer from intense social anxiety and once it was given some credibility by a doctor, I began to use it as an excuse to extricate myself from social situations, to blame it on awkward conversations and generally to become disassociated with all of the things that might have improved the condition. It was only when I identified what I was doing that I began to reframe my language and take actionable steps towards improving my social connections. This was extremely challenging, but over the long-term, it had a profoundly positive effect on my life. My mistake was in drawing the line between the condition and my personality too soon, losing some of my adaptable personality and agency to the realms that I believed to be in the control of the disorder; simply, I gave away territory to a region that I considered separate from me… A part I was not responsible for. This is not unique to me, I have heard many others proclaim joyfully that those elements that they were unhappy with are really just symptoms of a condition that they have been diagnosed with and thus they can indulge in avoidance behaviours guilt free. I am sympathetic to this, but concerned by the broader implications.

Mental disorders are currently on the rise, with suspicions that it is heavily related to digital media habits, which are themselves becoming more commonplace. With this rise in diagnosis, both medical and self-directed, we are quite rapidly increasing the total amount of agency and responsibility that is at risk of being abandoned across populations. I am not so naïve to conclude that there are not disorders that are so cognitively entangled that they are almost impossible to overcome. What I hope is that at a societal level, we become more careful with where we draw the line between disorder and the domain in which we can be more proactive. We may or may not determine our wills, but it would be wise not to obstruct them without good reason.

Conclusion

Free will seems only to have become such a contentious issue, because it has been built into the fabric of our propositions about morality and justice. It is a red herring in a sense. By allowing “free will” to assume a concrete definition, there can arise a coherent discourse, where debaters do not spend more time talking past one another than actual solutions. Further, non-philosophers can be spared the effort of pontificating over the manner by which wills come about. They can instead accept the frameworks and models which are designed to remain harmonious with both conclusions: “free will exists” or “free will doesn’t exist”. Thus far I have these general guidelines: increase exposure to experiences that build character, be more conscious in order to increase agency and ensure that the essential will is as best aligned with the consequence of actions as possible.

As ever, this is an open discussion. If you have some unique insight or critique, please share it below in the comments.

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Additional Resources

Bird’s eye view:

• Sam Harris’ excellent summation of the whole discourse Highly Recommended

• Quick fire summaries of different positions

• Robert Sapolsky and Alex O’Connor offer deeper insights

Determinism:

• Is the future predetermined?

• Can Free Will be saved in a determined universe?

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