Searching for Truth in Unequal things
A philosophical investigation into the nature of truth and its value, through the lens of Nietzsche's insights.
So many purport to be truth-seekers, yet are frequently the same people who recoil when they discover those truths which are unpleasant, ugly and inconvenient. Even of those brave ones, who are willing to collect truths, few pause to consider the origins or value of their prizes…
The Sacred Origin of Truth
In ‘The Genealogy of Morals,’ Friedrich Nietzsche questioned whether science, in particular, had ever seriously considered the value of truth. By his estimation, it had passively adopted the desire for truth from the religious attitude which preceded it:
"Science today has absolutely no belief in itself, let alone an ideal above it—and where it still inspires passion, love, ardor, and suffering at all, it is not the opposite of the ascetic ideal but rather the latest and noblest form of it." The Genealogy of Morals (Essay 3: Section 23) (1887)
Nietzsche’s aim was never to denounce truth on principle, only to ensure that one be aware of the drives which move them towards this end above all else. One way he problematised the simplistic view of truth - as equal to the good - was in highlighting the dangers of pursuing such an end. For example, that it risks disorientating one’s worldview or stifling their ability to act decisively. And suggesting, conversely, that lies or oversimplifications often had a more immediate and positive effect on the psyche.
Defining Truth
But first, it is important when speaking of such an elusive topic as truth, that one stops to consider its definition. This specificity may seem pointless, yet it is often the disagreement over meanings which propagate fruitless arguments. Here, I allocate the following definition to truth, based on its typical use case:
An accurate description of phenomena, in accordance with a specific system of understanding.
Note that truth, in this definition, is referring to the description of phenomena and its context within the internal rules of the system, not the phenomena itself. The utility and justification underpinning this clarification will be seen ahead.
Is truth created or discovered?
Language is a human construct and as such, the very structure and concepts can contain certain suppositions about the world, be those accurate or otherwise. One idea embedded into language is found in the way that people speak on truth and lies. One “discovers” truths, whilst “making up” or “inventing” lies. Take the sentence: “he made up a truth.” It is illogical within the bounds of English, because one assumes that truth cannot be created by words alone. There is also a particular emphasis on the truth, often taken as a reference to some metaphysical object which exists beyond the bounds of thought.
Adopting the typical usage of language, if I am holding a pen and speak the sentence “I am holding a pen,” my language appears only to state what is already true. Truth then, does not manifest when I utter the sentence, but in the moment that I pick up the pen. So, is this a metaphysical truth, or a pragmatic one? Is there an essential concept of truth, which manifests independently of any human perception? A critique of mathematics begins to answer this question.
Mathematics does not itself depend on ‘if: then’ relationships with the world, instead able to operate in a vacuum, using a set of agreed upon rules which are established at the outset. When I add two numbers together successfully, the understanding is that the answer was already preconfigured by the logic of the system, and nothing about this requires or is affected by correspondence in reality. However, if one does indeed attempt to project mathematics onto the world, Nietzsche’s concept of unequal things rears its ugly face:
“A word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases — which means, purely and simply, cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things.” Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873)
One defines a set of atoms as a single unit; for example a bell pepper, and then for every instance of an object which shares the sufficient characteristics of that pepper, one ascribes the same designation. So, a pepper, plus another pepper, becomes two peppers. This is a practical approach because for humans, it serves to divide by physical separation and patterns; to know what can be interacted with, what can be used for creating and what is a threat. A pepper can be moved independently of its surroundings, and people are not bound to the earth. Thus units and categorisations are made of these things. This is to say that, whilst the motivations behind these division are informed by experience and psychology, the divisions themselves are arbitrary.
For an example of an alternative, imagine a pastiche of reality with no directional lighting or movement, only flat colours. One would likely describe each of those aforementioned bell peppers in this reality as a large unit of red (the edible segment) and a smaller unit of green (the stalk). Indeed, they would unlikely be able to differentiate the peppers from their surroundings as independent objects. In short, utilizing the colour-based system of division to describe those same two peppers, would result in four things rather than two, or perhaps one tapestry of many colours. Here, even though the language system hasn’t changed, the human experience of the phenomena effects how many distinct things exist. Who is to say that this mode of division is more “arbitrary” or less “correct” in an objective sense?
As an interesting and pertinent aside, in the Russian language, shades of blue are commonly divided into two distinct colours, demarcating the light and dark versions. Researchers found that “Russian speakers were faster to discriminate two colors when they fell into different linguistic categories” (source), showing that the truth one discovers can be subtly altered by one’s system of understanding. This reaffirms the premise that any known truth is mediated, bound to language, practicality and human intuitions about the world.
Dividing infinite truths
The necessary dividing of the world suggests that people create the conditions and relevant context for truth seeking, then reap the fruits of this labour. This does not mean that truth exists only as a result of these systems being created:
That something is true is not contingent on one’s being conscious of it. Many unknown things are true by the specific configuration of language that one uses, and the fact that they are unknown is no strike against their truth value. For example, a great many things are and were true millions of years ago when no subject was present to systematise them. Just because no-one was actively watching, would not negate the truth claim that a volcano erupted. However, this would be but one truth - a human truth.
The reality is that truth is infinitely common, for the world can be divided by infinite metrics (all contingent on the observer’s capacity to understand the world): colour, shape, atoms, mass, radiation, concepts not known and concepts which shall never be known. In this way, the very practice of truth-seeking begins in chaos and essentially infinite complexity, so the mind is forced to make it smaller and better ordered. This necessitates losing information, in the same way as a file might be compressed at the expense of resolution.
Jacques Derrida said that one understands concepts by narrowing down and removing everything which is not the concept. A simple example being that “up” is contingent on being all that space which is not already registered under the concept: “down.” Likewise, I propose that one understands truths by eliminating every truth which is not the truth - whichever truth fits most securely in the established framework of understanding. Therefore, language, far from creating truth, actually has a limiting effect upon it, but in this way makes it more comprehensible to the human mind. Other factors, such as social conventions, also make dictates over what can be called truth. In short, language, the will to be understood, utility and the finitude of human life, all constrain truth seeking.
A valuation of Truths and Lies
This transition from truths to human truths is a necessary simplification, yet it comes with a perk. Since human truths necessarily correspond to established structures, they obtain a symbolic aura of scarcity; just as the gold standard once made the value of money more stable. There are of course truths which are common, such as those of mere observation and description, but their purity and rarity increase with utility, specificity and work-done. Though it is not as literal and definite as in the gold example, the psychological value of scarcity in truth should not be underestimated. In contrast, lies are not seen as restrained by this same scarcity and can be developed en-masse. One needs not even their sense organs to produce them, and even sanity is no true barrier. When one discovers a lie, as they might discover signs of counterfeit, they immediately understand that it has less value, or else attempt to deceive their own mind into re-entering the delusion. This to say, that a statement which is true in one universe, would have intrinsically higher value than that same statement in a universe where it is a lie. The words do not themselves contain the majority share of value, but the correspondence to reality, in accordance with the system used.
So why would one lie? That which a lie loses in value of scarcity, it recoups in utility and flexibility. If one is able to create the illusion of value, by convincing others that it is really a truth, it becomes a powerful tool. A truth is sturdy, demanding that humans adapt to its conditions. Lies invert this equation, themselves adaptable and serving human whims. This also occurs internally, where the mind is able to “reason” its way into a lie for psychological benefits. Then, one is able to craft the world to their own ideal, yet by the same stroke becomes dependent on the lie. This is a dangerous wager, for it allows the mind to idle.
To return to Nietzsche, he understood the value in useful lies, but I think that he recognised that a useful truth was generally favourable if it were properly integrated. Assuming the premise that there is indeed scarcity in truth, his own methodology of valuation seems to compliment my argument:
“How should there be a "common good"! The term contradicts itself: whatever can be common always has little value” - Beyond Good and Evil (1886)
Applying the Correct System
Given that truth is so expansive, one may apply whichever theoretical system they like. This meaning that anything can be true, simply by changing definitions or the margins of division. I could for example, change the definition of human to include anything up to six legs and increase the world’s population by a significant margin. However, this would render language useless in trying to make sense of the world.
A system’s role might then be seen akin to that of a military scout. The scout must make accurate AND practical assessments of an enemy’s movements and numbers. In reporting back to their generals, they may make a series of true claims, yet not all will be equally valuable in this context. For example, the scout could explain that he saw “ a hundred thousand strong legion,” or “an army,” (both technically true), but the former is clearly the correct resolution of information and will positively affect the decision making of the strategists. It is a scarier truth, but nonetheless a useful one.
This creates an incentive to be critical of where systems may not be optimized or properly used to benefit people, whilst cautioning against any tampering with the foundations of systems without very good reason. Many people are either dogmatic over language, math etcetera, or conversely, fail to respect these systems’ integral roles in human flourishing. As with everything, a balance must be struck.
The Perils of Truth
Granting all the above caveats to what one means when one speaks of truth, and returning to my original definition, there are clear advantages to truth seeking. For a start, human truths have consistently been put towards tangible, sophisticated results, such as computing. There is also a greater cohesion achieved on the interpersonal level when people minimise deceit towards each other, and the aforementioned value that truth obtains in scarcity is also important for healthy psychological function. However, I have not yet addressed the dangers of truth in full.
There are certain ideas which are terrifying, for they so fundamentally damage the foundations of one’s worldview, like a flood rushing into a city. Take true, for just a moment, the idea that one might not have free will in the traditional sense - that one will always be driven by a will which occurs spontaneously from subconscious mechanisms and which can only be superficially inhibited by proper frontal cortical function. For those daring, read here:
The inevitable conclusion of not having free will is that the current justification for making people personally responsible collapses, and must be rebuilt by some other means. Given that notions of personal responsibility and free will underpin the majority of western morality and legal justice, this truth has monumental implications. Only this taste, I will give to reveal the bitterness of truth, for it is more than sufficient to make my point.
The Philosopher’s relationship with truth
“The strength of a person’s spirit would (…) be measured by how much ‘truth’ he could tolerate, or more precisely, to what extent he needs to have it diluted, disguised, sweetened, muted, falsified.” Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873)
For the majority, myself included, it would be impossible to face all of the truths that are discovered, but nonetheless many truths are valuable resources.
Of the five descriptors Nietzsche listed in the previous passage, dilution, sweetening and muting at least allow for some administration of truth, without blatant deceit. For example, one could seat truth in a helpful philosophy or context, being honest about the truth, yet sprinkling a layer of sugar upon it. Albert Camus’ famous phrase: “One must imagine Sisyphus happy,” and supporting philosophy is an exemplary illustration of this approach. It recognizes Camus’ “truth” that the world is not intrinsically meaningful, and rather than letting one drown in the existential dread which follows, he explores how one might cope and thrive in this worldview.
By instead creating a lie, unbound from principals of scarcity, one pushes back the problem onto future generations, just as modern people have inherited the falsifications of their ancestors (not to be ungrateful for the many impressive developments of technology, culture and infrastructure that have also been inherited). Lies, no matter their utility and sweeter taste, must never be revealed in their true nature, lest they become untenable. By integrating truths where lies would otherwise be necessary, one might absolve later generations of these burdens. However, one must also respect the dangers for the modern day of presenting too much truth, with too clumsy a hand - this I see as the core defect of many intellectuals today, who confuse their own acceptance of truth for a universal. The delicate balance, then, is not for every generation to take as many truths upon themselves as they can find, but for truths to be gradually and carefully introduced into the zeitgeist. This way, people build on foundations of concrete, rather than sand.
Preserving the commons, as a common good, is actually worth more than people imagine.